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Chapter

1

1.1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction
This publication seeks to establish a background for understanding the
complex and dynamic linkages between urbanization, migration, HIV/AIDS
and urban food security in Southern and Eastern Africa (SEA). As urbanization accelerates, direct food transfers from rural areas are increasing as poor
urban households seek to reduce their vulnerability to high food prices and a
cash-intensive urban existence. At the same time, urban households or individual migrants remit money back to households in rural areas both inside and
outside the country of employment. A significant proportion of remittances
are used for consumption purposes, including the purchase of food.1 These
processes are underwritten by various forms of rural-urban, cross-border and
circulatory migration.
Migration has clearly facilitated the rapid spread of HIV in the SEA region
over the last two decades.2 For a number of reasons, migrants and other
mobile people are especially vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. The epidemic, in turn,
is leading to new forms of migration, including children’s migration and return
migration of PLWHAs (People Living with HIV and AIDS) to rural areas.3 Not
only does this lead to a decline in remittances but it places a greater burden
on rural households. Rural food production for urban household members may
also be negatively affected by the impact of HIV/AIDS on rural producers. In
the context of HIV/AIDS, migrants themselves may be unable to pursue other
food security avenues, including urban agriculture.
As HIV/AIDS creates both short term and long term intergenerational
impacts within the framework of its long wave epidemiological pattern, the
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development context is changing considerably. In order to formulate appropriate policy responses, it is therefore imperative to understand the complex
linkages and transfers of people and commodities which characterize the “new
social economy of migration” in the SEA.4 At the same time, it is important to
understand the inter-related connections between migration and HIV/AIDS for
two basic reasons. First, migrants are a particularly vulnerable group, both to
HIV infection and to resultant food insecurity. Second, a disease which eats
away at the fabric of the new social economy of migration will severely test
the ability of urban and rural areas to provide a secure food supply for their
populations, both at the aggregate and household levels.
It is against this backdrop that this publication documents the key dimensions of the complex connections between urbanization, migration, HIV/AIDS
and food security. There is an existing and growing literature on some of these
connections; between migration and HIV/AIDS, for example, and between
HIV/AIDS and rural food security. However, the linkages between HIV/AIDS and
urban food security are less well-established. In addition, attempts to link both
HIV/AIDS and urban food security simultaneously with migration are only now
being considered, and this project is the first to examine these dynamics at the
regional level. That task is rendered more challenging by the fact that migration
itself has been undergoing rapid changes in form over the last decade.
The publication is divided into three sections. It is designed to lay the foundation for further discussion and the articulation of a targeted action research
agenda which addresses both the knowledge gaps and the policy and programming needs of the region in this field of development.
This paper begins by reviewing the literature on urbanization and migration in SEA, showing how rapid urbanization is not eliminating migration but
intensifying its scope and scale. The section also provides an overview of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic in SEA and seeks to establish the reciprocal connections
in the HIV/AIDS and migration nexus. Finally, the section reviews current evidence on the determinants of food security in urban areas.
The second chapter focuses on the links between migration and HIV/AIDS,
migration and food security, and HIV/AIDS and food security. Research on
these sets of linkage is proceeding apace although much more is known about
the impact of HIV/AIDS on rural than urban food security.
The third chapter draws together these sets of relationships and outlines the
key knowledge gaps and emerging research questions for the region. Although
the research literature is not yet developed in this regard, various conceptual
models have been devised to help understand these relationships. Although
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some of these models focus on rural food security and some on urban, this
paper argues that the distinction is artificial, and that migration is the “missing
link” between the urban and the rural. Migration links the rural and the urban
social economies and emphasizes the point that urban food security cannot
be isolated from rural food security and vice-versa. Finally, the paper proposes
some next steps in developing a fully fledged and policy-relevant research
agenda.

1.2

Urbanization and Internal Migration
Urbanization is defined as the process by which an increasing proportion of
a country’s population lives in urban areas over time. By this definition, SubSaharan Africa (SSA) is urbanizing faster than any other region. Although the
urban transition has been relatively recent, more than 50% of SSA’s population
should be living (permanently or temporarily) in urban areas by 2030.5 Indeed,
the urban population of SSA is set to more than double between 2000 and
2020, from 217 million (34.3% of total population) to 487 million (46.2%
of total population).6 The growth in urban population in many countries of the
SEA region has been dramatic between 1990 and the latest census. Although
relative changes cannot be compared outright due to the variable time periods involved, rates are relatively modest for countries such as Botswana and
Zambia but reach as high as 6% for Mozambique (Table 1).
As illustrated in Table 1, for selected countries of SEA, urban growth rates
exceeded population growth rates for the period 1990-2003. For the 21 year
period between 1982 and 2003, urbanization increased significantly in most
countries, with rates more than doubling for Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho and
Mozambique. This massive growth is reflected in the expansion of the number
and size of mega-cities. By 2010, SSA will have at least 33 cities which
exceed a million people. Metropolitan Johannesburg – the second largest
mega-urban region at 3 million – will be at the core of the Gauteng region,
which is expected to reach 20 million by 2020.7

||

MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

Table 1: Population and Urban Growth Rates 1990-2003 and Urbanization
1982-2003
Country

% Population
Growth Rate
1990-2003

% Urban
Growth Rate
1990-2003

Urban
Urban
Population (% Population (%
of total) 1982 of Total) 2003

Botswana

2.3

3.6

22.5

50.3

Ethiopia

2.3

4.4

10.9

16.6

Kenya

2.4

5.6

17.6

36.3

Lesotho

1.0

4.2

14.6

30.3

Madagascar

2.9

5.1

19.5

31.4

Malawi

2.0

4.4

9.6

15.9

Mozambique

2.2

6.2

14.6

35.6

South Africa

2.0

3.5

48.2

59.2

Uganda

2.9

5.3

9.2

15.3

Zambia

2.2

2.4

39.8

40.3

SSA

2.5

4.6

21.8

36

Source: Kessides based on World Development Indicators 2005
8

Within countries, rates of urbanization in major cities commonly exceed 4 to
5% per annum. The average primate city had annual growth rates of 5 to 6%,
for example, while some saw rates of 10%, which means a doubling of city
populations every ten years (less if annual increases are compounded).
There are four main drivers of urban growth in SSA: natural increase from
existing urban residents; reclassification of rural as urban areas; internal ruralurban migration and international (rural-urban and urban-urban) migration.
Most of the anticipated growth in the size of cities and towns over the next
three decades will occur because of the transformation and reclassification of
formerly “rural” settlements on the peripheries of major cities and because of
natural increase within cities. Although migration is not the central driver for
rapid urbanization, it plays a major role in the growth of cities as well as in
strengthening the linkages between rural and urban areas and between the
cities of the SEA.
Significantly, circular migration is still the dominant form of migration in
most African countries. Traditional one-way movements from rural to urban
destinations are much less important than circular and seasonal migration.9
In other words, the census-based urbanization figures for countries shown in
Table 1 include significant numbers of people who are living temporarily in the
cities and who maintain a rural home or base which they return to on a regu-
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lar basis and keep in close contact with. In West Africa, for example, Gugler
recently replicated a Nigerian study he originally carried out in 1961 and found
not only that urban-rural ties continue to be strong but reach beyond immediate kin to kinship groups, non-kin groups, villages and larger political entities.
He argues that these ties are prevalent throughout Africa and that rural-urban
migrants who maintain them and incur their costs are motivated by “present
or future material rewards, political opportunities, social status and cultural
commitments.”10
In order to maintain strong social relations within the village, migrants still
spend time in villages for weddings, funerals, harvests and business, followed
by the necessity to spend more time in town to acquire more cash. The circular
nature of this constant movement back and forth signifies “the simultaneous
and overlapping presence of urban and rural spaces in migrants’ lives.”11 The
circular nature of rural-urban migration is also highlighted in several recent
Southern African studies. In Zimbabwe, by 1994 only half as many migrants
as in 1988 felt their future lay in Harare, indicating increased insecurity around
urban life, employment and earning potential among in-migrants.12 The importance of rural-urban social relations is also highlighted in Andersson’s study of
Buhera migrants in Harare.13 He argues that the social security of rural-urban
migrants is not spatially situated in rural agricultural production but rather
socially situated in the rural-urban network. These networks are expressions of
socio-cultural dispositions and are a more appropriate lens through which to
view the motivation behind migration.
In Lilongwe, although rural-urban migration seldom results in permanent
urban residence, migrants frequently spend periods of time in urban areas
in order to improve conditions of life in villages.14 In South Africa, one study
emphasizes the resilience of urban-rural links even when the rural areas
are so impoverished that they provide little by way of a livelihood for rural
households.15 In this case, migration centres on basic needs and income security, with job-related migration just one aspect of migrating families’ search;
infrastructure, social capital and institutional climate all influence migration
demand. The results of the study indicate the instability of KwaZulu-Natal’s
rural population, rooted in the collapse of the natural resource base, overcrowding, violence, dispossession and hardship.
There is evidence that secondary cities have become important destinations
for migrants. In Tanzania, migration during the 1980s targeted smaller towns
(20,000-50,000 population) – where it was easier for urban households to
secure food – over larger and primate cities.16 Similarly, Owuor’s study on
urban rural-links between the secondary town of Nakuru in Kenya and its rural
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hinterland demonstrates that urban-rural linkages are not only important for
rural households, but are becoming an important element of the livelihood (or
survival) strategies of poorer urban households.17
There is also evidence that circular migration between rural and urban areas
is increasing due to high costs in the city.18 For many of the disenfranchised,
such as landless peasants or those exposed to shocks of violence, deprivation and uncertainty, rural-rural migration is quite significant.19 Significantly,
the Namibia Migration Project found that at the national level, rural-rural
migration accounted for half of all internal lifetime mobility.20 It is important
to recognize, therefore, that rural and urban boundaries are artificial distinctions to extended or “stretched households”, who often disperse members
widely to different spaces, locales and economic activities in order to support
sustainable livelihoods.21 This mobility allows individuals and families to gain
new experiences and income that can be used when, where and however they
decide, according to collective and individual strategies. While the household
is increasingly “stretched” spatially, it is also differentiated internally, not least
along gender lines.
The gendered nature of migration drivers and processes needs to be recognized. Internationally, the “feminization” of migration refers more to shifts in
the character of women’s movements, rather than a dramatic increase in numbers (which have always been greater than traditionally recognized). In SEA,
there are both qualitative and quantitative changes in internal migration under
way. The absolute number of female migrants has been increasing rapidly. But
the reasons for migration have also been shifting and diversifying.22
Gender and age are significant in migration decision-making and selectivity.23 Where home employment opportunities are limited, women may be more
apt than males to migrate for employment in order to support other household
members. This migration may also afford women an escape from social and
family constraints and provide them with greater independence.24 In addition,
young men with limited access to family land and waged work may also be
driven to migrate.25 Within Southern Africa, for example, more women are
entering the work force and more women are becoming household heads and
these factors are helping to drive female migration. In South Africa, women
comprised 30% of the African adult labour migration population in 1993,
and this had risen to 34% by 1999. Between 1997 and the year 2000, the
proportion of females among temporary migrants increased from 15% to 25%
for older adult women and from 5% to 15% for young adult women – both
significant increases within a short three year period.26 The primary destination for young adult women, older adult women and female children is the
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province of Gauteng, which is the industrial heart of South Africa. Women are
also moving their families out of rural villages into nearby small towns on a
permanent basis.
Data from 2002 reveals that the three main prompts for permanent internal
migration of adult females are at the start or end of marriage, a move to a new
dwelling for the household or a move to live with another partner.27 The predominant driver for temporary female migration in 2002 was for work, which
constituted the reason for more than 80% of moves of women aged 35 and
older. Other reasons for temporary migration included for school/study and to
live with another.28 In Namibia, the increase in female migration to Windhoek
over the past ten years, and the fact that urban female-headed households are
poorer on average than any other household type, both indicate the feminization of rural poverty.29
Chronic poverty is no longer an exclusively rural problem, however, but is
increasingly concentrated in urban areas. In SEA, the urban poverty rate is
within 20% of the rural rate in Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi and Mozambique.
At present, at least one third or more of the urban population in Ethiopia,
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia is poor.30 Increased
pauperization, combined with rapid urbanization, has created massive growth
in the slum population of Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Between 1990 and
2001, the African urban slum population increased by 65 million, at an average annual rate of 4.5% compared with a total population growth of 2.7%. By
2001, 166.2 million people, or 72% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s urban residents,
were living in slums. Based on these estimates, and without effective interventions, the continent’s slum population may double every 15 years, compared
with a total population doubling period of 26 years.31
Problems of insecure tenure, overcrowding, and lack of clean water and
sanitation and resultant health problems are severe and add to social and economic vulnerability of urban residents. National and municipal governments
are under severe pressure to handle the implications of rapid urbanization
with respect to basic service provision, housing, transportation, health care,
education and employment – all of this within the constraints of economies
debilitated by the impacts of structural adjustment programs, globalization,
and the impact on the labour force and social systems of HIV and AIDS.
Much of the literature on internal rural-urban migration to date has concentrated on the remittance of urban goods and cash to the rural areas, with little
note being taken of social linkages or rural-urban flows of cash, goods and
produce.32 From the perspective of rural livelihoods, many researchers have
made the argument that environmental stress due to high population growth
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fuels rural-urban migration in the context of declining agricultural output.33
Migration, then, is a means by which rural households can diversify their
economic base.34 The ways in which rural and urban households are mutually
tied by social links and relations of reciprocity are not well-articulated in the literature.35 The new social economy of migration needs to be better understood
before the implications of HIV/AIDS for food security can be grasped.

1.3

Cross-Border Migration
SEA has a long history of cross-border intra-regional migration, dating back
to the mid-nineteenth century. These movements tended to be rural-urban in
character but also include urban-urban movements and, particularly in border
zones, rural-rural movements. Longstanding patterns, forms, and dynamics of
migration have undergone major restructuring in the last three decades with
considerable implications for livelihood strategies of the poor and for poverty
reduction policies. These changes include the following:
•

The end of colonialism and apartheid, which were political systems
designed to control internal migration and exclude most outsiders, have
produced new opportunities for internal and cross-border mobility and
new incentives for moving.

•

SEA’s integration into global and continental labour markets and trade
networks has opened the region up to forms of migration commonly
associated with globalization (such as temporary work schemes and skills
migration.)36

•

Growing rural poverty has pushed more people out of rural households in
search of a livelihood.

•

Environmental factors (including climate change, natural disasters and
land degradation) continue to cause hardships and shocks which push
people out of rural areas.

•

Economic and political crisis and growing unemployment in some states
have forced people to seek work in other countries.

•

The feminization of poverty in rural SEA has produced a significant gender reconfiguration of cross-border migration streams.37

•

The countries of the SEA have experienced recurrent waves of forced
(refugee) migration over the last three decades. The cessation of threat
confronts countries of origin and asylum with issues of repatriation and
integration of returning migrants.
||
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According to the latest UN estimates, there are more than 14 million
international migrants in Sub-Saharan Africa. East Africa hosts 4.4 million
international migrants, many of whom are refugees from Ethiopia and the
Sudan.38 Within Southern Africa, the number of foreign-born migrants in South
Africa was over 1 million in 2001. Short-term legal visitors to South Africa
from other Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries also
increased more than tenfold after 1990 to more than seven million per year
at the present time.39
The states of SEA are conventionally divided into migrant-origin (e.g.
Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho, Zimbabwe) and migrant-destination states
(e.g. South Africa, Botswana, Namibia). In practice, most states both send
and receive migrants, though in varying numbers. Several international migration streams can be identified in the SEA. All have been undergoing significant
change including:
•

Restructuring of traditional contract labour systems

•

Growth in the volume and complexity of cross-border mobility

•

Declining levels of legal migration to and within the region

•

Expansion in undocumented migration and human trafficking

•

Increase in skills brain drain from the region

•

Large-scale resettlement and reintegration of refugees

•

Feminization of cross-border migration

•

Growth in intra-regional informal cross-border trade

•

Rapid urbanization and growing cross-border urban-urban migrant networks

Legal and undocumented cross-border migration throughout SEA has
exploded in the last decade. The pressure on limited border control resources
has been enormous with long delays and inefficiency experienced at many border posts. Corruption is an endemic problem at many posts as travelers seek
to bypass cumbersome and time consuming bureaucracies and gain unlawful
entry. In addition, the region has experienced a major influx from other parts
of the continent as well as significant growth in tourism arrivals from overseas.
Intra-regional tourism has also grown to significant levels.
The reasons for the new mobility are many and varied (Table 2). The majority of intra-regional migrants to South Africa do not, contrary to popular opinion, enter to work or to look for work. Representative SAMP surveys of migrants
in 6 SADC countries reveal a multiplicity of motives.40 Cumulatively, in 6
SADC countries less than 25% went to South Africa to work or look for work.
However, there was considerable inter-country variation: Mozambique (67%),
||
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Zimbabwe (29%), Lesotho (25%), Namibia (13%) and Swaziland (9%).
Other major reasons included: visiting/tourism (Namibia and Swaziland 58%),
Lesotho (36%), Mozambique (17%), and Zimbabwe (16%); and trading and
shopping (Zimbabwe (42%), Lesotho (22%); Swaziland (12%), Mozambique
(6%), and Namibia (3%). Other reasons included to study, conduct business,
and seek medical treatment.
Historically, the primary form of legal cross-border migration for employment (labour migration) in Southern Africa was male migration to the mines
of South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and the commercial farms and plantations of South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. By the 1990s, only the
South African gold and platinum mines continued to employ large numbers
of foreign migrants; other mining sectors in South Africa (such as coal mining) and elsewhere in the region (Zambia, Zimbabwe) had moved to a local
and/or more stabilized workforce.41 During the 1990s, the South African mines
experienced major downsizing and retrenchments which created considerable
social disruption and increased poverty in rural supplier areas. The mines laid
off local workers at a much faster rate than foreign workers. As a result, the
proportion of foreign workers rose from 40% in the late 1980s to close to
60% today. This “externalization” of the workforce was particularly beneficial
to Mozambique. Mozambicans now make up 25% of the mine workforce, up
from 10% a decade ago (Table 3).

Table 2: Reasons for Cross-Border Migration to South Africa
Country of Origin
Reason for
Entry

Botswana
%

Lesotho
%

Mozam.
%

Namibia
%

Zimbabwe
%

Work

7

17

45

11

15

Seek work

3

8

22

2

14

Business

6

2

2

8

7

Buy and
sell goods

2

3

2

2

21

Shopping

24

19

4

1

21

Visit family

23

34

12

13

39

Medical

5

6

4

4

2

Holiday

14

2

5

19

3

Study

3

1

1

3

2

Other

12

8

2

12

3

Source: SAMP POS database at http://www.queensu.ca/samp
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Table 3: Migration to the South African Mines, 1990-2004
Country of Origin
Year

S.Africa

Botswana

Lesotho

Mozam.

Swaziland

Total

1990

232,338

14,497

98,788

43,951

16,618

406,192

1991

208,961

11,979

93,072

46,102

17,291

377,405

1992

185,177

12,000

92,727

49,022

16,157

355,083

1993

175,158

11,827

87,326

44,255

15,802

334,368

1994

170,876

10,939

87,248

49,250

15,101

334,414

1995

123,038

9,525

87,098

53,321

14,611

287,593

1996

126,762

9,608

80,485

54,891

14,241

285,987

1997

126,326

8,552

71,415

52,520

11,980

270,793

1998

104,483

7,229

56,132

49,507

9,518

226,869

1999

95,923

5,376

44,958

42,002

6,308

194,567

2000

95,146

5,373

50,472

44,245

8,079

203,315

2001

99,260

4,763

49,477

45,893

7,840

207,233

2002

115,824

4,227

54,154

51,355

8,697

234,257

2003

112,438

4,205

54,478

53,828

7,970

232,919

2004

120,146

3,924

48,962

48,918

7,598

180,586

Source: SAMP POS database at http://www.queensu.ca/samp
Remittance levels have remained stable in Mozambique but fell during the
1990s to many areas, especially Lesotho, Swaziland and the Eastern Cape.
This has presented a major challenge for households formerly reliant on mine
remittances. Poverty levels have increased, as have domestic and family tensions. Other family members, particularly women, have begun to migrate in
response. Various efforts have been made to soften the impacts of retrenchments but the overall impact has been devastating for rural areas and households once reliant on migrant remittances.
The migrant stream that attracts most public, media and official attention is
“undocumented”, “illegal” or “irregular” migration.42 Irregular migration tends
to be driven by economic circumstances and, in some cases, desperation.
Enforcement in all countries tends to focus on identifying and deporting violators. In terms of sheer volume, South Africa is easily the regional leader, having
deported over one million people since 1994.43 Significantly, the vast majority
of deportees from South Africa (upwards of 80%) are sent home to only two
countries: Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Studies of sectors where irregular
migrants are employed have revealed consistent violation of labour standards,
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sub-minimum wages, economic and sexual exploitation, and great instability
and fear among migrants. These sectors include commercial agriculture in rural
areas and construction, services and secondary industry in the cities.44
SAMP research has shown that the majority of cross-border migrants in
Southern Africa are also circular migrants.45 In other words, although many
migrants stay for longer than initially intended their visits are generally temporary not permanent. Across a whole range of indices, migrants prefer living in
their own countries. The major migrant-receiving countries are seen as superior only in terms of employment and economic opportunity and, sometimes,
health facilities. In every other respect – personal and family safety, educational opportunities, access to land, cultural life and so on – home countries
are viewed as preferable. The obvious conclusion is that economic stability and
growth at home would be the single most important factor in slowing labour
migration across borders.
Like internal migration, cross-border migration in Southern Africa is profoundly gendered. In the colonial period, women were generally prohibited from
migrating. As the primary reason for migration in the region was wage employment, men dominated internal and cross border migration. Today women and
men are differently involved in and affected by migration. Although women are
increasingly part of the movement of skilled migrants within the region and
out of it, and have proportionally higher educational levels than male migrants,
they are more likely to be involved in less skilled and informal work. They are
also more likely to be irregular migrants, with attendant disadvantages, as it is
harder for them to access legal migration channels.46 Women are migrants in
their own right, as well as partners of migrant male spouses.47
A SAMP study found that male respondents were more likely to have been
to South Africa than female (Mozambique: 41% of men and 9% of women;
Zimbabwe: 25% and 20%; Lesotho: 86% and 76%).48 But the reasons for
migration tend to differ along gender lines (Table 4).
The main sectors of employment for women include agriculture (particularly
seasonal work), domestic work, the service sector and trade. Men are more
likely to have formal employment, particularly in the industrial (especially mining), agricultural and construction sectors. Women migrants were more likely
to be disadvantaged by the migration experience than their male counterparts.
They are more likely to be single or widowed, but less likely to be in formal sector employment or to own property than their male counterparts.49 Migration is
a significant livelihood strategy for women and women-headed households.50
Although women constitute a significant part of cross border and internal
migratory movement, they are also left behind as employment and earning
opportunities favour men.
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Table 4: Gender Differences in Migration to South Africa from 6 SADC
States
Purpose of Most Recent Visit to SA

% Males

% Females

Work

33

7

Look for work

17

3

Business

3

3

Buy and sell goods

4

10

Shop

13

23

Visit family/friends

17

38

Holiday

3

3

Medical

2

8

Other

8

5

Source: SAMP database, http://www.queensu.ca/samp
Another particularly common, and growing, form of women’s migration is
motivated by opportunities for trading in other countries. Indeed, the urban
areas of the SEA are being increasingly integrated into transnational continental and regional informal trade networks.51 Informal traders or small entrepreneurs are amongst the most enterprising and energetic of contemporary
migrants. Trading is a key means of livelihood for many households in some
countries and needs to be better understood and, wherever possible, facilitated
by policy changes governing entrance, exit and customs duties. Informal sector
cross border trade is important to the transfer of goods and commodities in
the region. Initial studies of informal cross-border trade in the region suggest
that it:
•

Is significant to the movement of food and agricultural goods in the
region,

•

Plays a role in regional food security,

•

Plays a part in the development of small and medium enterprises,

•

Is a household livelihood strategy particularly for female-headed households,

•

Engages a significant number of women,

•

Constitutes a significant proportion of cross-border traffic in the SADC
and COMESA regions,

•

Has been largely ignored by policy makers who have yet to engage with
this trade.52
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However, more needs to be known and understood about the extent of
informal sector cross border trade in the region and its role in livelihood strategies and food security, and an income earning opportunity for women. Further
research is required to better understand the relationship between these
entrepreneurs their businesses, poverty alleviation, agricultural commodity and
consumption chains and food security. Furthermore, research could inform the
development of training programs to enable them to develop their businesses
as well as access financial resources.
Cross-border migration has a strong relationship to poverty, social exclusion,
and poverty alleviation.53 Data on the remittance behaviour of cross-border
migrants and receiving households is limited. Similarly, little information is
available on their impact on national economies, economic development,
inequality and financial systems in the region.54 Furthermore, remittances
in the form of goods are not recorded. Data on cash remittances is hard to
gather as foreign exchange regulations, weak financial infrastructures and high
transfer costs in formal systems encourage the use of informal channels for
transferring money.
Despite the lack of reliable data, it is apparent that remittances to home
areas do contribute significantly to household livelihoods and food security.
Remittances may be in goods or cash. Remittances can play a key role in the
livelihoods of migrant households allowing for social, or human capital investment in education, health and housing and food. They may also be used as
capital to invest in income earning household inputs and to capitalize entrepreneurial activities.

1.4

The HIV/AIDS Epidemic
As Iliffe and Gillespie have both indicated, AIDS epidemics are multi-dimensional, long-term, phased phenomena.55 The first wave of HIV infection is followed by a wave of opportunistic infections, tuberculosis being the most common. The onset of AIDS illness and death occurs several years later. In the final
stage, depending on the prevalence of the disease and availability of treatment,
there is an accumulation of macroeconomic and social impacts at household,
community and national levels. At the local level, Barnett and Topouzis identify
three main stages that a community may pass through: 56
a)

AIDS initiating; with very low HIV prevalence rates and no AIDS
impacts,

b)

AIDS-impending; where HIV prevalence rates are rising but most infected
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people are still in the asymptomatic phase before becoming ill, and
c)

AIDS-impacted; when households and communities feel the impact of
AIDS as infected people succumb to AIDS-related illnesses and eventually
die.

In the context of the global epidemic, Africa remains the most affected
region, with 25.8 million people living with HIV (Table 5). Even though Africa
is home to just over 10% of the world’s population, two thirds of people living with HIV are in Africa, as are 77% of all women with HIV. In 2005, an
estimated 2.4 million adults and children died from AIDS-related illnesses and
another 3.2 million became infected with HIV.

Table 5: HIV and AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2003-2005
Year

Adults &
children
living with
HIV

Adults &
children
newly
infected
with HIV

Adult
prevalence (%)

Adult
& child
deaths
due to
AIDS

No. of
women
(15-49)
living with
HIV

% HIVinfected
adults (1549) who
are female

2005

25.8
million

3.2
million

7.2

2.4
million

13.5
million

57

2003

24.9
million

3.0
million

7.3

2.1
million

13.1
million

57

Source: Compiled from UNAIDS, 2005
Declines in adult national HIV prevalence have been recorded in just three
countries: Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe.57 Life expectancy for people living
in eight countries (Angola, Central African Republic, Lesotho, Mozambique,
Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe) is forty years or less, largely
due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In 20 countries, average citizens are poorer
today than they were a decade ago and in 11 countries more people go hungry
than they did a decade ago.58
Table 6 shows the number of persons living with HIV/AIDS and emphasizes
the fact that even where prevalence rates are much lower, hundreds of thousands to millions of people are still affected. South Africa leads the way with
5.3 million persons, followed by Zimbabwe at 1.8 million, and then Tanzania,
Ethiopia, Mozambique and Kenya, all of which are over 1 million, with
Malawi and Zambia both approaching 1 million. Access to ARTs vary widely
within each country: at least one third of those who need ART in Botswana
and Uganda are receiving treatment, while in Zambia, Kenya, and Malawi
10-20% of those in need of ART were receiving it by mid-2005. Most needs
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went unmet. In South Africa, by mid 2005, at least 85% of those who needed
ART were not receiving any, and this figure was 90% or higher for Ethiopia,
Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.59
As Table 6 shows, with the exception of Cape Town, urban HIV prevalence
far exceeds national HIV prevalence and in many Eastern African countries the
urban rate is two to three times the rural HIV rate. As established above, cities
and towns are growing at exceptional rates, with rapid expansion of informal
settlements. Hundreds of thousands of people are forced to live in conditions
without basic services, security of tenure and in extreme overcrowding. These
conditions enhance personal vulnerability and lead to much higher HIV prevalence.

Table 6: National and Urban HIV Prevalence in Southern and Eastern
Africa, 2005
Country

National HIV
Prevalence Rate

Urban HIV
Prevalence Rate

People Living With
HIV/AIDS

Zimbabwe

21% (2004)

Harare 25%

1,800,000

South Africa

21.5% (2003 est.)

Cape Town 15%
Durban 28%

5,300,000

Malawi

20%

Blantyre 28%

900,000

Mozambique 16%

Maputo 17.3%

Zambia

16.5% (2003 est.)

Lusaka 22%

920,000

Namibia

21.3% (2003 est.)

Windhoek 24%

210,000

Uganda

7%

Kampala >9%

530,000

Kenya

7%

Busia/Meru/Nakura/
Thika 9%

1,200,000

Tanzania

7%

Urban 11%
(2x rural areas)

1,600,000

Rwanda

5.1% (2003 est.)

Urban 6.4%
(rural 2.8%)

250,000

Burundi

6%

Bujumbura suburb
13%

250,000

Ethiopia

4.4%

Urban 12-13%

Somalia

0.6%

Mogadishu 0.9%

Sources: UNAIDS 2005; The World Factbook 2005.
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1.4.1

Southern Africa

Southern Africa remains the epicenter of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, with high
HIV prevalence rates throughout the region, excepting Angola. The only
national epidemic in the region which shows some evidence of ebbing is in
Zimbabwe. Here, data from a national surveillance system shows that HIV
prevalence among pregnant women dropped from 26% in 2002 to 21% in
2004 (although the role of unreliable government statistics in this decrease
is not known). At 1.7 million people, and a poverty rate of 70%, the capital city of Harare has an overall HIV prevalence rate of 25%. However, HIV
prevalence in women who attended antenatal or postnatal clinics dropped
from 35% in 1999 to 21% in 2004 in Harare. Even though the rate of new
infections could be slowing and mortality rates leveling off, 20% of pregnant
women still test HIV positive and infection levels remain amongst the world’s
highest.60 Nationally, life expectancy at birth dropped from 51.8 years in 1995
to 38.2 years in 2001. The WHO recently reported that Zimbabwean women
now have the shortest average life expectancy in the world at 34 (compared
with Zimbabwean males at 37). Although the WHO attributes this solely to
HIV/AIDS, Zimbabwean doctors indicate that the failed health care system (in
the midst of severe economic and political crisis) has meant that more women
are dying from pregnancy and childbirth.61
In Bulawayo, the country’s second largest city with a population close to one
million, between 1990 and 2000, the overall death rate of 13.7 (per thousand
population) had more than doubled, and HIV-related diseases were the leading cause of death in all age groups from 1 to 64 years.62 Between 1995 and
2001, life expectancy in Bulawayo dropped by more than a decade from 52.4
to 41.2 years.63
The Zimbabwe situation has been further exacerbated by the Government's
Operation Restore Order (Operation Murambatsvina), a major nationwide
demolition and eviction program which started in Harare and spread to all
other urban centres in 2005. With the demolition of thousands of homes,
business premises and vending sites, it is estimated that 700,000 people
lost their homes, their livelihoods or both, and indirectly another 2.4 million
people were affected. Hundreds of thousands have been rendered homeless,
without access to any basic services, and education for thousands has been
disrupted. This disproportionately affected the poor and disadvantaged, who
are now deeper into poverty and more vulnerable. Many of the sick, including
those with HIV and AIDS, no longer have access to health care.64 There is a
major concern that increased vulnerability and population mobility, including
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spousal separation and livelihood insecurity, could negatively impact the HIV/
AIDS epidemic.65
In South Africa, HIV prevalence among pregnant women has reached its
highest level yet: 29.5% of women attending antenatal clinics were HIV positive in 2004.66 More than one in three women aged 25-34 and almost one
in three women aged 20-24 were estimated to be living with HIV. The worstaffected province is KwaZulu-Natal, with a prevalence of 40%, but prevalence
is also high, between 27% and 31%, in the Eastern Cape, Free State, Gauteng,
Mpumalanga and North West provinces. The incredible speed of the evolution
of the epidemic in South Africa – with national adult HIV prevalence at less
than 1% in 1990 increasing to almost 25% by 2000, has meant a concomitant increase in mortality: Death rates of those 15 years and older increased
by 62% from 1997-2002 and deaths in the 25-44 age group more than
doubled during that time. At present, South Africa experiences an estimated
900 deaths a day from the epidemic.67 Urban HIV prevalence rates cover a
wide range: Cape Town (population 2 million) has a prevalence of 15% while
Durban (population of 3 million) has a 28% prevalence rate. The Actuarial
Society of South Africa estimates that it will be another 10 years before the
pandemic breaks.68
Exceedingly high prevalence rates – often over 30% for pregnant women –
are still recorded in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. In Swaziland,
HIV prevalence among pregnant women increased from 34% in the year 2000
to 43% in 2004. Prevalence is even higher at 56% among pregnant women
in the 25-29 year old group. Within Swaziland, there is little regional variance
in HIV prevalence among pregnant women and the overall national HIV prevalence is 39%.69 In Lesotho, HIV prevalence is 27% amongst antenatal clinic
attendees, down slightly from 29% in 2003.70 National HIV prevalence has
reached 31%. Botswana also has a national prevalence rate of 39%, although
national prevalence among pregnant women has remained between 35% and
37% since 2001, which may indicate some stabilization. For pregnant women
25 years and older, prevalence soared to 43% in 2003.71
Malawi experiences wide regional variation in prevalence from 7% in the
central region to 33% at the southern tip, with national prevalence around
20%. Two negative trends here are increasing prevalence at rural clinics
and rising prevalence amongst young pregnant women (15% for 15-19 year
olds and 20% for 20-24 year olds).72 In Blantyre, with a population which
exceeds 700,000 and an urban poverty rate of 54%, the HIV prevalence rate
is 28%.73
The epidemic in Mozambique is increasing, with rising levels in all regions
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and an estimated increase in national adult HIV prevalence from 14% to
slightly above 16% in the 2002-2004 period. In the capital city, Maputo, with
a population of 966,837, HIV prevalence is 17.3%. Population migration and
mobility is a driving force, since HIV is spreading faster in provinces which
have main transport links with Malawi, South Africa and Zimbabwe. High
infection rates are also evident in Gaza province, which borders Zimbabwe and
South Africa, and is a major source of migrants for South African industry and
farms, and in Sofala province, which is divided by Zimbabwe’s main export
route.74
In Zambia, HIV prevalence among 15-44 year old pregnant women has
remained at 18-20% since 1994. However, rising prevalence for 15-19 yearolds attending antenatal clinics between 1998 and 2002 indicate that new
infections continue to occur at significant rates. In the capital city of Lusaka
(population 1.6 million), there is a 52% urban poverty rate and an HIV prevalence of 22%. Altogether, urban residents are twice as likely as rural residents
to be infected with HIV. The highest levels of infection are once again tied
to population mobility and are tied to cities and towns situated along major
transport routes. This includes Kabwe, Kapiri, Mposhi, Livingstone and Ndola,
where 22-32% of pregnant women were HIV positive in 2002.75
Angola has the lowest HIV prevalence rate within the region with an estimated 2.8% of pregnant women testing positive. However, the capital city
of Luanda had reached a prevalence of 4.4% in 2004. A prevalence rate of
33% has been found amongst commercial sex workers, indicating potential
for major epidemic growth.76 The highest prevalence is located in the two
provinces of Cunene and Kuando-Kubango, both of which share a border with
Namibia, in a region where migration is significant.77
There is considerable geographical variation in levels of HIV prevalence in
Namibia, from 8.5% in Opuwo in the remote northwest, to 42% in Katima
Mulilo, which is situated in the Caprivi strip which borders Angola, Botswana
and Zambia, an area of high mobility. Some parts of Namibia therefore experience rates equivalent to the worst hit areas of Swaziland, Botswana and South
Africa. The mobility of the mining and fishing labour force results in high rates
in the coastal towns of Luderitz, Swakopmund and Walvis Bay (22%-28%).78
Windhoek, the capital city (population 233,000) has a prevalence rate of
24%, and has experienced dramatic in-migration since independence in 1990,
as illustrated in the graph below (Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Rural-Urban Migration Trend for Windhoek: 1944-2000
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HIV/AIDS in Urban Southern Africa
Southern Africa has the highest HIV prevalence rates in the world. It is
also home to 30% of all global persons living with HIV/AIDS. Botswana and
Swaziland have the highest prevalence rates in the world at 39% and
the only country that has shown any decrease in prevalence has been
Zimbabwe, although these figures are questionable and also predate
the impact of Operation Restore Order. HIV prevalence in urban areas is
higher than national prevalence levels as are regions along borders and
transport routes which experience high levels of mobility. These serious
national AIDS epidemics are set to continue for some time.

1.4.2 

East Africa

Turning to East Africa, although national prevalence within Uganda peaked at
over 15% in the early 1990s, this has declined and may be the result of a
major national campaign. At present, national prevalence lies at 7%, although
it rises to 10% for Ugandans in the 30-39 year group. In urban areas in
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Uganda, HIV prevalence among women was almost twice as high as men
(13% versus 7.3%). Overall infection rates were highest for the capital city of
Kampala (population 1.2 million) at more than 9%, and for the Central and
North-Central regions.79 Little is documented about the effect of conflict on
HIV prevalence rates; however, there is currently a RENEWAL study underway
in Uganda which examines the situation of internally displaced people in the
refugee camps.80 Moreover, the continued conflict in northern Uganda may
contribute to a renewed increase of HIV and AIDS in the country, particularly
amongst children and women.
Kenya’s epidemic peaked in the late 1990s with a national adult prevalence
of 10%, which dropped to 7% in 2003. Infection levels for urban residents
peaked in the mid 1990s, prior to that of rural residents, which later dropped
but at a slower rate than urban areas. Kenya has the distinction of being only
the second SSA country whose national HIV infection rates have declined
steadily. The clearest example of this turnaround has been amongst pregnant
women in the urban centres of Kenya – especially in Busia, Meru, Nakaru
and Thika – where HIV prevalence dropped from 28% in 1999 to 9% in
2003. There have also been falls in other urban areas, including the capital,
Nairobi (population between 3 and 4 million). The decline in Kenya’s national
prevalence rates can be attributed to several factors, including behavioural
change, the mature stage of the epidemic where death rates can exceed new
infection rates, and the deaths of the more at-risk population which removes
them from the transmission circuit.81 While these declines appear remarkable
in the broader regional context, it is important to emphasize that in Kenya, as
elsewhere, prevalence rates vary significantly across the country, potentially
masking hard-hit communities who may be bypassed by interventions as a
result.82 For example, the fishing communities of the Lake Victoria Basin have
a lifestyle that exposes them to viral transmission and their prevalence rates
of 31% are testimony to this. Similarly disproportionate prevalence rates have
been recorded among fisherfolk in the adjacent countries of Tanzania and
Uganda.83
Although the prevalence rate in mainland Tanzania is fairly low at 7%, it is
twice as high in urban (11%) than in rural areas. Altogether, it is estimated
that 1.5 million people are living with HIV/AIDS. Although 12 years ago antenatal clinic HIV prevalence reached 20% in Mbeya and 36% at some clinics,
it now appears to have stabilized. Antenatal infection rates have declined in
Dar es Salaam and Mtware since 2002, but they have risen in the capital
city of Dodoma (population over 300,000). However, according to a recent
survey in rural parts of the country, 40% of married men admitted to having
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extramarital affairs which presents an alarming trend for the possibility of new
infections.84
Urban areas in Rwanda also mirror patterns found elsewhere, with prevalence twice as high as for rural areas (6.4% median prevalence in 2003
compared with 2.8% for rural areas) and with the capital city of Kigali (2005
population of 851,024) the worst hit. HIV prevalence fluctuations range widely
in Burundi, from 2% in Kiremba to 13% in a suburb of the capital city of
Bujumbura with an estimated national prevalence rate of 6%.85
Urban HIV prevalence rates in Addis, Ethiopia, are almost three times the
national level of an estimated 4.4%. Pregnant women in towns and cities
have had HIV prevalence rates between 12 and 13% since the mid 1990s.
However, with 85% of the population situated in rural areas, more people in
rural areas are now being infected than in urban, with rural prevalence increasing from 1.9% in 2000 to 2.6% in 2003.86 While this may be the trend, rural
poverty is chronic, severe and in many cases worsening with time, raising general vulnerability to HIV and AIDS through poverty mitigation (usually survival)
behaviours involving mobility. For example, women and girls, facing destitution
from asset losses, move to towns to begin making a living in the commercial
sex worker industry and expose themselves to HIV.87 The challenges facing
Ethiopia are significant: there are more than 1.5 million people living with HIV
(2004) and more than 4.5 million orphans, of whom at least 500,000 are
AIDS orphans. AIDS caused an estimated 30% of deaths in 2003, and in mid2005, fewer than 10% of people who needed ART were receiving it.88 Deaths
due to AIDS have already brought down life expectancy which was expected to
fall by 4.6 years in 2003.89 It is noteworthy that in terms of disease stage and
prevalence rates, Ethiopia is now where South Africa was in 1994.
HIV prevalence rates are low for both Eritrea and Somalia. In 2003, Eritrea
had a low national adult prevalence of 2.4%, with regional ranges from under
2% to more than 7%. In Somalia, a 2004 national survey of pregnant women
recorded an average rate of 0.6%, with the highest infection rates found in the
capital city of Mogadishu (0.9%).90 With 7% of women attending one clinic
in Mogadishu found to be HIV positive, it appears that urban concentration
is once again the dominant pattern. Knowledge of HIV transmission is very
low, which indicates the need for a prevention and education program, but in
societies where sexuality and sexual practices are not openly discussed, such
programs face significant obstacles.
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Urban HIV in Eastern Africa
National adult HIV prevalence rates are much lower in East African countries compared with Southern African countries although HIV prevalence
rates still remain high. Cities and towns tend to exceed national and rural
prevalence rates. Although epidemics appear to be stable, they remain
serious and will continue for many years to come. Socio-economic and
socio-cultural factors which create and enhance vulnerability need to be
addressed.

1.5  Determinants of Urban Food Security
The right to food has been recognized by various international declarations,
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.91 Food security is usually defined as “access by all people at all times to sufficient food for an active
healthy life.”92 Definitions of food security usually include food supply, access,
adequacy, utilization, safety and cultural acceptability of food for all people at
all times.93 Barrett outlines four major elements of a useful operational conception of food security:94
•

the physiological needs of individuals (nutritional requirements and
energy expenditure levels);

•

the complementarities and tradeoffs among food and other basic necessities (most notably health care and education, among other things);

•

changes over time, and people’s perceptions of and responses to these
changes (for example, consumption smoothing) and, especially;

•

uncertainty and risk (vulnerability, and people’s perceptions and responses to risk).

Food security is no longer viewed as a failure to produce enough food nationally, but rather as a failure of livelihoods to provide an adequate supply at
the household level.95 Dowler maintains that food insecurity is a synonym for
food poverty, which reflects the fact that food insecurity goes beyond physical
efficiency of food consumption to include the ability “to acquire or consume
an adequate quantity or quality of food in socially acceptable ways, or the
uncertainty that one will be able to do so.”96 These conceptions are reflected
in factors which help to measure the degree of food insecurity. A population or
livelihood group is considered acutely food insecure if:
•

people experience a large reduction in their major source of food and are
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unable to make up the difference through new strategies;
•

the prevalence of malnutrition is abnormally high for the time of year, and
this cannot be accounted for by either health or care factors;

•

a large proportion of the population or group is using marginal or unsustainable coping strategies; and

•

people are using ‘coping’ strategies that are damaging their livelihoods in
the longer term, or incur some other unacceptable cost, such as acting
illegally or immorally.97

Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region in the world where the number of
people who live in extreme poverty has almost doubled over the last two decades: from 164 million in 1981 to 314 million today.98 Chronic urban poverty
is critically linked with urban food insecurity. As urban areas within SEA grow
at unprecedented rates, the infrastructure and tax bases of cities cannot meet
the increased demands for services and this has led to increased crowding and
a deteriorating urban environment.99 This means that access to health care,
water, housing and education are all problematic.100
Levels of urban poverty appear to be increasing in much of Africa.
Unemployment and underemployment are characteristic of urban economies
which have been in decline since the 1970s and 1980s, exacerbated by rapid
urbanization rates.101 Cities and towns are cash-intensive and residents often
have to pay for goods and services (such as fuel and housing) that they do not
have to pay for in rural areas. High costs for non-food essentials means that
urban dwellers spend a smaller proportion of their incomes on food because
they must pay for goods such as housing, energy, transportation, household
items, education, health care and personal items.102 Also, prices vary not just
between rural and urban areas but also between urban areas.
As poor households struggle to meet urban expenses, the type, quantity and
quality of food consumption tends to be an area of cut-back since it is not
viewed as a fixed, absolute expense. Thus, households are thrust into food
insecurity. Kironde, for example, found that in Tanzania the income needed for
2000 calories per day was 19.7% higher in towns (excluding Dar es Salaam)
than rural areas and 98.2% higher in Dar than in rural areas.103 Many recent
urban poverty assessment studies reaffirm this trend. For example, in Accra,
Maxwell et al found that urban households buy more than 90% of their food
and 40% of households could be classified as insecure with respect to calorie
intake. In low-income settlements in Dhaka, for sake of comparison, 50% of
the population was below the chronic poverty line and 42% was below a local
line of minimum food plus 20% for basic necessities.104
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The analysis of food insecurity is usually focused upon risk factors and
whether households can cope with shortfalls. In the city, this revolves around
access to cash for food and basic necessities, which is tied directly to wages
and prices, but also includes factors such as overcrowding, an unhygienic
environment and the lack of a functional safety net.105
Food prices are integral to the food security of urban dwellers. Urban retail
markets in most developing cities are small and scattered, and although this
may not be efficient, they do serve the needs of the poor, who are forced to buy
food every day and in small quantities since they lack the cash to buy in bulk.
For many years, food prices in urban areas were kept cheap through subsidies,
overvalued exchange rates and trade restrictions. However, structural adjustment programmes during the 1980s and 1990s reversed these policies and
led to food prices that often increased much faster than wages.106 The urban
poor are further hampered by their dependence on low wage, casual, temporary or seasonal work and thus their cash flows are intermittent and influx,
which directly impacts upon their ability to buy food.
In Southern Africa, in particular, many people are undernourished due to poor
quality diets and infections. A poor diet usually means inadequate quantities
of protein, carbohydrates and micronutrients which are all necessary for various human functions. Pregnant women who live in environments which lack
iodine need to consume iodized salt for the normal development of the foetal
brain. In addition, if people do not consume enough fruits and vegetables,
deficiencies in vitamins A, C and other nutrients make them more susceptible
to disease.107 Research in many developing countries shows that poor nutrition
leads to reduced productivity.108 A recent study by the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI) in 15 developing countries revealed that poverty
and malnutrition increase along with urbanization. Using WHO data, the study
found that the urban share of underweight children increased in 11 of the 15
countries and the absolute number increased in 9 of the 15 countries.109
Children are particularly vulnerable to the effects of malnutrition and malnourishment. Malnutrition in the form of stunted and underweight children
worsened in South Africa during the late 1990s.110 A recent UNICEF study of
childhood nutritional status in Southern Africa over a ten year period showed
deterioration in conditions in Zimbabwe and Zambia in 2001-2003. Overall,
2.3 million children were underweight in the 6 countries studied, with more
than 30% of children in Malawi and Mozambique showing stunted growth. In
all countries except Lesotho and Swaziland, urban and peri-urban areas started
with the lowest levels of underweight children but deteriorated the most over
the ten years, while most rural areas tended to improve.111
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Although African cities are growing at an unprecedented rate and urban poverty is back on the agenda with respect to both research and donor priorities,
Maxwell contends that urban food security has become politically invisible. He
cites several reasons for this:112
•

urban food security is fairly invisible to urban planners and managers as
they scramble to deal with more urgent visible political issues such as
unemployment, the informal sector, overcrowding, decaying infrastructure
and declining services – even though food security and malnutrition are
all linked to these other problems;

•

unless there are major problems with food supply or sudden increases in
food prices, food insecurity rarely becomes a political issue and therefore
is dealt with at the household level; and

•

development theory has reinforced the notion that food insecurity and
poverty are generally rural problems.

One aspect of urban food security which has largely been ignored in the literature is that of urban food remittances from extended and immediate family
in the rural areas. Frayne explores this issue in Namibia, and finds that rural
sources of food are important for migrant and non-migrant households alike in
the context of limited employment and high rural-urban migration.113 In this
study, 66% of Windhoek households had received food over the past year from
friends and relatives in the rural areas and 58% were sent food from 2-6 times
in the past year.
The reciprocity between rural and urban households is key here, with urban
households sending cash remittances to rural families in the semi-subsistence
sector which drives the purchase of food and other necessities in the rural
areas and thereby contributes to the availability of a ‘rural surplus’ for remitting to the urban household. Thus, social networks are the infrastructure that
enables the flow of goods between rural and urban areas.114 However, there
are gender differences in amounts and types of food received and for women it
is the lack of well-established links to the north as well as rights to land that
account for the fact that they receive smaller amounts of food.
Potts also found in Zimbabwe that households which have access to rural
production are remitting increasing amounts of food to urban areas.115 In addition, Oucho reports that it is usually rural households with access to urban
remittances who are the most productive farmers in East Africa, which may
apply to Southern Africa. In his study, Oucho found that 48% of urban remittances are used either to buy or improve land and that the strength of ties
between rural and urban households stimulates the rural economy at both
household and community levels.116
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2

2.1

MAKING THE
LINKAGES

Migration and HIV/AIDS117
Links between HIV/AIDS and migration are complex.118 The highest incidence
of HIV/AIDS is in the SEA countries with good transport infrastructure, relatively high levels of economic development, and highly mobile populations.
Migration is tied to the rapid spread and high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the
following ways:
•

Migrant communities are socially and economically marginalized and
have high rates of infection;

•

Migrant social and sexual networks make them more vulnerable to infection;

•

Migration encourages high-risk sexual behaviour;

•

Migrants are harder to reach for preventive education, condom provision,
HIV testing and treatment and care.119

The incidence of HIV is generally higher among migrants and the sexual
partners of migrants.120 The infection rate is very high amongst truck drivers
– over 90% reported in one South African study.121 Border towns have high
HIV prevalence, as places where truck drivers encounter stable local populations, and are removed from AIDS intervention programs.122 Refugees and
internally-displaced persons are also especially vulnerable to HIV infection.
In linking human mobility and the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS, it is important
to note that different forms of migration lead to different social and geographical forms of migrant ‘community’, and thus to different causes and cultures
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of risk. Where single-sex labour migration is regularized and formalized as
in the South African mines, migrant communities and an associated migrant
culture has developed.123 Sex and sexuality are integral components of such
cultures, including commercial or ‘transactional’ sex and heterosexual as well
as homosexual relations, in addition to sex with a female partner at ‘home.’
Other forms of mobility disrupt or prevent the formation of any stable, placebased community. People who have multiple ‘homes’, or who spend a lot of
their time away from or between homes, lead lives of contingent encounters
and short-term relationships, whether economic, social or sexual. This encourages high-risk sexual behaviour, including obtaining sex on a commercial basis.
For example, in Zambia, low-income men living away from home for one or
more months per year are more than twice as likely to die as men living at
home.124 While ‘on the road,’ women especially are vulnerable to exploitation
and harassment, which can include sexual assault. In Malawi, poor women
and girls who undertake cash-earning piecemeal work (ganyu) beyond the
confines of the village are particularly at risk as transactional sex is increasingly incorporated into ganyu contracts.125 The gender dynamics of migration
therefore lead to differences between men and women in terms of their risk of
exposure to HIV.126
HIV/AIDS is also becoming an increasingly important cause of migration and
mobility. For example:
•

People with AIDS commonly return to live with family members to obtain
care;

•

Loss of income though death or debilitation of a migrant encourages
migration by other household members;

•

HIV/AIDS can lead to a decline in rural productivity and food security,
increasing pressure for out-migration;

•

Replacement of migrant workers with HIV/AIDS with new migrant workers;

•

Migration to avoid stigmatization;

•

Migration to obtain health care;

•

Skills gaps and shortages could prompt countries to seek replacement
skills from other countries;

•

AIDS orphans (who may themselves be HIV positive) migrate to live with
relatives or to seek their own income-earning opportunities;127

•

New widows or widowers (also themselves often HIV positive) may
migrate upon the death of their partner.
|28|
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In drawing attention to the connections between HIV/AIDS and human
mobility, it is essential not to “stigmatize” migrants as bearers of disease, as
people to be ‘kept out’ by implementing stricter migration controls. Xenophobia
further marginalizes already-vulnerable migrant communities and exacerbates
the socio-economic conditions that contribute to the spread of HIV. Likewise,
legal restrictions that attempt to prevent migration create clandestine flows
of people, excluded from access to social and medical services. Instead of
futile attempts to prevent people from moving, there need to be HIV/AIDS
interventions, from education and prevention through testing and counseling
to treatment and care, that are designed for and targeted at particular migrant
populations.
There are at least four broad categories of mobile population, each demanding a different form of response:
•

Migrant or immigrant communities of people who have left one place to
settle in another, either long-term or permanently. They require focused
interventions in their new location until such time as they become fully
integrated into their new societies;

•

Trans-migrants who have ‘homes’ in more than one location. They require
interventions at both ‘homes’ as well as in transit;

•

Itinerant or mobile populations, who either have no ‘home’ or who spend
most of their time away from home (truckers, seafarers, CSWs, construction workers). Perhaps the most difficult to reach, as they do not constitute a spatially fixed community, these people require interventions that
mirror their movements, for example condoms at truck stops, education
material on buses, mobile clinics and so on;

•

Temporarily displaced communities such as refugees and internally displaced persons. Interventions require rapid response in highly mobile
form, especially in conditions where the very circumstances forcing people to move, such as war, simultaneously expose them to the threat of
HIV infection.

Infusing migrant communities with education, prevention, testing, treatment
and care is the only realistic means of dealing with the current HIV/AIDS epidemic and containing its further spread. To further stigmatize or marginalize
migrants, or even to ignore their particular HIV/AIDS intervention needs, serves
only to strengthen the dangerous synergy between HIV/AIDS and migration.
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2.2

Migration and Food Security
Impacts of out-migration on source areas vary considerably. Migration can be
a response to poverty but, as Skeldon notes, the extremely poor are generally
excluded from migration opportunities. While migration may reduce poverty it
almost always enhances inequality, since migration is a selective process.128
The major issue is what opportunities are available to which groups and
whether the type of migratory work benefits migrants and their families by
improving their assets and human capital.129
The links between migration and food security specifically need to be viewed
at two levels. First, at a more general level, there is the question of whether
migration facilitates or undermines the overall food security of rural and urban
populations. Second, there is the more specific question of the food security of
migrants themselves and how this is secured.
As indicated above, flows of migrants are increasingly complex. In general,
however, households in SEA use migration as a survival and accumulation
strategy, along with income diversification. Krokfors views migration as a
response to poverty and environmental stress, and uses the term ‘multi-active
households’ to describe households which engage in different income generating activities.130 One characteristic of these changes is risk spreading or risk
management on the part of households as they engage in multiple modes
of livelihood to improve their standard of living or to just survive. Jamal and
Weeks refer to this as the ‘trader-cum-wage earner-cum-shamba growing’
class.131 Tacoli notes emerging higher levels of multi-activity, notably among
younger generations, and an increase in mobility accompanied by strong social
and economic links with home areas. Typically, therefore, households are now
spatially “stretched” between rural and urban areas.
There is now what Frayne terms a ‘complex system of cyclical or reciprocal
migration between rural and urban areas.’ This has led to an increased interdependency of rural and urban systems and ‘reciprocal urbanization’ where
movement of people and goods back and forth is supported by enhanced
communications and transportation.132 Owuro postulates that the terms ‘multispatial households’ and ‘multiple-home households’ are not as appropriate as
‘multi-spatial livelihoods’ since different income-generating activities in different geographical locales does not necessarily imply a divided household.
‘Multi-spatial livelihood’ means that a household has both urban and rural
sources of food and income.133 In one study of households with multi-spatial
livelihoods, households which combined crop production with marketing, and
several non-farm and off-farm income-generating activities were found to be
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the most successful economically and the most food secure.134
The impact of migration on rural agriculture is also a key consideration.135
The relationship is complicated by numerous other factors. De Haan, for
example, notes that the impact is dependent on “the context, on seasonality
of movement, educational levels of migrants, the length of time spent away,
assets, and social structures and institutions allowing – in case of single male
migration – women and others to pursue activities previously reserved for men
and household heads.”136 Logically, if migration deprives rural areas of labour
and impacts negatively on production, then it is likely to increase the food
insecurity of rural populations. In Central Mali, for example, absent young men
were sorely missed, especially by the smallest households, and remittances
were seen as poor substitutes for young men’s labour.137 In a Malawi study,
45% of women were performing tasks once handled by men, but women were
quite over-burdened and did not receive enough remittances to hire labour.138
In his study on migration and food security in Namibia, Frayne identifies distress migration where children from urban homes are sent to stay with relatives elsewhere because households did not have enough money to support
the children in Windhoek. Another form of distress migration is to send adult
members to the rural areas, either as returnees or new migrants in situations
where few in the household are employed. This reduces the need for the urban
household to “ration food, sell assets, borrow food or money, or engage in
crime to survive.”139
The picture is further complicated by two factors: first, absent migrants are
not food consumers which may decrease the pressure on the consumption levels of the household. Second, migrants who have gainful employment or other
income-generating activity in town commonly send remittances home. There
is some evidence that remittances from urban to rural areas are declining.140
But the fundamental question is what rural households do with remittances
in cash and kind. Are these remittances invested in rural agriculture and other
productive income-generating activity? The evidence from a recent study by
SAMP of remittance usage in 6 SADC countries found that in general they
are not. Looking at household averages for all countries, food and groceries
are by far the most important (93% of households) followed by transportation
(44%), fuel (44%), utilities (38%), education (31%) and medical expenses
(30%). Certain categories of expenses are more important in certain countries.
Education (primarily school fees) is important in Zimbabwe (57% of households) and Mozambique (44%); medical expenses are important in Zimbabwe
(40%), Swaziland (39%) and Mozambique (31%); and savings are important
in Zimbabwe (36%) and Botswana (28%). Housing is a major category only in
Zimbabwe (46%); as is clothing in Lesotho (73%) and Zimbabwe (54%); and
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farming expenses in Swaziland (39%). This tends to confirm other evidence
that women in Swaziland were able to increase agricultural production through
a combination of remittances from absent males and through government provision of a tractor-rental service.141
When the amount spent by category is compared across countries, the
largest amounts were spent on building (R576), farming (R434), clothes
(R267), food (R288), and special events (R239). Building is the largest
median expense category in all five countries with food expenses second in
Lesotho (R400) and Mozambique (R251), third in Botswana (R346), fourth
in Zimbabwe (R64) and fifth in Swaziland (R300). However, looking only at
the amount spent on such items as building and special events skews the
picture because these expenses affect relatively few households. When the
weighted value of expenditure items is compared, the major importance of
food as an expense category is revealed. It is the most important expense item
in all five countries. The three most important items by country in 1000s of
rands are: Botswana: food (R186), clothes (R33), fuel (R31); Lesotho: food
(R377), clothes (R371), special events (R75); Mozambique: food (R124),
clothes (R24), building (R22); Swaziland: food (R281), farming (R232), education (R116); and Zimbabwe: food (R40), education (R18), building (R15).
Depending on the country, between 2 and 6 times more money is spent on
food than the next most important expense item which highlights the importance of the food expense for migrant-sending households. In other words, the
evidence to hand suggests that migrant remittances are not generally invested
in farming but used primarily to purchase food to increase the food security of
rural household members.
As noted above, there is scattered evidence from throughout SEA that food
transfers from rural to urban areas are well-established and even increasing in
volume. Frayne, for example, found that the percentage of urban households
which received food regularly was higher than the percentage of those who
remitted cash to rural extended family members. In Harare, Drakakis-Smith
reported that 20% of respondents received gifts of food from rural areas.142 In
Dakar, Senegal, there was also a considerable flow of both food and cash from
rural to urban homes.143 In Kenya, rural crop cultivation far exceeded urban
cultivation in its contribution to the energy requirements of urban residents in
Nakuru.144 This research supports the general tenet that transfers of food, and
sometimes cash, from rural to urban areas are on the increase and that the
balance of favour is moving to the urban side.
The second area of focus in unraveling the connections between migration and food security concerns the situation of migrants themselves. Does
migration itself have a positive or negative impact on the access of migrants
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in urban areas to quality food? This question requires much further research.
One area which has received some attention is the issue of urban food production (or urban agriculture). Within urban and peri-urban areas, there has been
an increase in urban agriculture (UA) since the late 1970s. As real wages
have declined over time, and as imported food prices have risen, many urban
residents have turned to UA. Ellis and Sumberg145 summarize the reasons for
engaging in UA as follows:
•

as a means of survival for the very poor;

•

as a personal strategy for women to meet part of family food security
needs in the context of insufficient, uncertain or unstable cash allocations
by male wage earners within the household;146

•

as a contribution to food security in general;

•

as a substitute for cash purchases of food, especially for higher priced
food such as eggs, meat, milk, fruit and vegetables so that cash can be
used for other items;147

•

as a means to supplement cash earnings of the family and meet other
objectives such as children’s schooling;148

•

as a commercial rather than subsistence activity.

Many engage in UA for a combination of reasons and these are not mutually exclusive. Some studies have found that many high and middle-income
households tend to engage in UA, usually for commercial reasons. In a study
based on Gabarone, Hovorka makes the argument that UA plays a very important entrepreneurial role which increases the agency of urban dwellers.149
In Nairobi, Freeman finds that UA is dominated by women who are divided
into those who farm for subsistence and those who farm for cash income.150
However, poorer households, which include newly arrived migrants, are often
excluded from access to land due to both formal and informal gatekeeping
within the city.151 The question therefore arises as to the extent to which
migrants participate in UA and its benefits.
In general, rural-urban migration has been thought to improve the personal
food security of the individual migrant. In some sectors, such as mining and
plantation agriculture, this is clearly the case. The mines and estates have an
interest in maintaining a well-fed workforce and provide regular and nutritious
meals as a supplement to wages. Similarly, migrants in the services sector are
likely to have access to cheap, good quality food. On the other hand, migrants
working in sectors such as construction and industry may have to spend a
disproportionate part of their wage envelope on food. Migrants in employment
or self-employment are certainly not individual consumers. Many have depend-
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ents in urban areas and pool resources into a “common pot” to sustain the
urban half of the split household (or a separate urban household with another
partner and dependents). Although migrants are largely dependent on cash purchases for food, urban food prices (particularly where there is a thriving informal
sector) may be lower than in rural areas. However, the evidence suggests that
poor urban households, including migrants, spend a disproportionate amount
of their income on food. If there is strong pressure to remit, they may be more
vulnerable to going short themselves.
New forms of urbanization and migration are clearly emerging. They reflect
complex demographic, social and commodity exchanges, based on reciprocity
and reciprocal migration. Food transfers are vital to urban food security at the
household level. Remittance transfers are equally vital to food security in many
rural areas. Households with weak ties to rural families and without access
to rural land to cultivate, including the poorest urban households and some
female headed households, are the most vulnerable to deprivation and generally live under severe risk of hunger.

2.3

HIV/AIDS and Food Security
At a biological level, macro- and micro-nutrients play a critical role in the
immune response to infectious diseases and survival. Since HIV directly
attacks the immune system, HIV and malnutrition work in tandem:
HIV compromises nutritional status and this in turn increases susceptibility to opportunistic infections. Malnutrition, on the other
hand, exacerbates the effects of HIV by further weakening the
immune system. Clinical studies show that HIV disease progression
is more rapid in individuals with compromised nutrition.152
Within HIV-affected households, there is increased risk of food insecurity and malnutrition as sick members are unable to work, income declines,
expenditure on health care increases, care-giving burdens increase and there
is less time for looking after children.153 The concept of nutrition security has
also come forward as a key dimension in the prevention, care, treatment and
mitigation of HIV/AIDS. A household can be viewed as nutrition secure when
access to a variety of food is accompanied by a sanitary environment, adequate
health services and adequate care to ensure a healthy life for all household
members.154
At the community level, because HIV/AIDS strikes the most economically
active and because it is so widespread, the impact is not just across sectors,
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but significantly systematic.155 In assessing the impact on agriculture, the FAO
suggests that if four people for each of the 42 million people living with HIV are
impacted, the virus will affect 160 million globally. The resulting humanitarian
crisis would be especially acute in Southern Africa, where many countries have
prevalence rates over 17%. By 2020, Namibia could lose up to 26% of its
agricultural force due to HIV/AIDS, Zimbabwe 23%, Mozambique and South
Africa 20% and Malawi 14%.156 Table 7 shows the impacts HIV/AIDS has on
agricultural systems and household food security.
Table 7: Common Impacts of HIV/AIDS on Agriculture
How HIV/AIDS changes the
context of agricultural growth

Leads to:

Labour changes:

Less land being farmed

Shortage of household labour due to:

Underfarming of land

Mortality

More child labour

Surviving adults doing care-giving

Less labour-intensive crops grown

Shortage of hired labour due to:

Emphasis on small livestock and cash crops
Greater emphasis on small livestock cultivation

Mortality

Decline in marketed output for crop processors

Migration to cities

Natural resource mining (the future is heavily
discounted)

Lack of cash to pay for it
Loss of farm-specific knowledge:
Premature mortality curtails period
for intergenerational role modeling
and knowledge transfer

Less appropriate farming practices within a
more hostile farming environment
More inexperienced farmers who need
training, role models (e.g. youth)

Income changes:
Fewer earners, increase in
dependency ratio

More off-farm income sources

Greater expenditure on medical,
transport, special needs of ill

Migration

Institutional and organizational
changes:
Loss of institutional knowledge, high Weaker rural institutions (e.g. extension
turnover, low investment in staff
services, microfinance institutions, NGOs)
development
Weaker social capital
Weakening of property rights for some
Weakening of asset base of women
(especially land)
Source: Haddad and Gillespie (2005)157
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As Table 7 illustrates, the impact of HIV/AIDS is not only immediate, but
cumulative and far-reaching. As social capital erodes, youth are left untrained
and unprepared for agricultural production and decisions related to the future.
The average life expectancy in SSA is now 47 years, an average of 15 years
lower than it would be without HIV/AIDS.158 In addition, young people are
inheriting debts and are forced to increase cultivation in order to try to feed
more dependents without much knowledge of agricultural techniques, indigenous knowledge, and biodiversity and without much chance of accessing
credit and knowledge through community or state institutions.159 The loss of
indigenous knowledge and biodiversity is critical, since these are major assets
which become even more important as other tangible resources diminish
within affected rural communities.160
All of the above factors have resulted in a decline in production. For example, a study conducted in Zimbabwe found that output on smallholder farms
decreased by 29% for cattle, 49% for vegetables and 61% for maize for
households which had experienced an AIDS-related death.161 Altogether, maize
production had dropped 54%.162 Cassava production has steadily increased
over a five year period and replaced more labour-intensive crops such as maize
in an attempt to compensate for lost labour through HIV/AIDS in Malawi,
Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe.163 Foods which are easier to cultivate
are often poorer nutritionally and many households also resort to skipping
meals. In addition, households suffer loss of livestock as they are used for
sources of food during funerals of relatives who have died from HIV/AIDS.164
Illness or death has an immediate impact on households. In western Kenya,
Onyango et al. found that death-affected households spent an average of $462
per year, compared with $199 for illness-affected households and $21 for nonaffected households. With this amount of cash tied up in illness and death,
households were less able to invest in agricultural inputs: illness-affected and
death-affected households spent 56% and 61% respectively of the amount
spent by non-affected households on agricultural inputs.165
In considering the likely consequences of HIV/AIDS on the agricultural sector of the hardest hit countries in SEA, Jayne et al. predict that AIDS-related
labour shortages may induce labour migration from the urban informal sector
into agriculture. They also suggest that for poorer, smallholder households,
land will remain a key constraint on income growth. For highly afflicted rural
communities, AIDS-induced decapitalization in the form of loss of savings, cattle assets, draft equipment and other assets may become the greatest limits on
rural productivity and livelihoods for these communities.166
Human capital is depleted, resources are diverted away from agriculture
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and there is a loss of both farm and non-farm income. There are also the
psychosocial impacts of witnessing the illness and death of spouses and parents and of facing possible destitution.167 When these factors combine, the
lack of food and lack of access to food intensify. De Waal terms this the ‘new
variant famine’ since it targets productive adults and more women than men
rather than children and the elderly who are the traditional victims of famines.168 Within communities, women and girls assume care-giving roles which
takes time away from productive tasks. Women are the most vulnerable to
HIV/AIDS infection and also to the economic impact of HIV/AIDS.169 Younger
girls are also highly susceptible and may be forced to leave school and assume
care-giving roles and eventual care of younger siblings as parents die. All of
this impacts upon the long-term development potential of women and girls.170
In Zimbabwe, Senefeld and Polsky found that households with chronically ill
adults were more likely to have their children drop out of school and more
likely to resort to migration strategies in order to ‘cope’.171 The Southern African
Regional Poverty Network (SARPN) asserts that the cycle of poverty and AIDS
entrenches a system of chronic impoverishment: “[T]his weakened social fabric
means that families cannot recover previous levels of social functioning, and
may even resort to strategies that imperil them further, because the negative
consequences of such remedies are not immediately apparent”.172
Figures 2 and 3 below portray scenarios with vulnerable and less vulnerable
rural households, both of which experience the migrant male household head
returning from an urban area with HIV. Both households eventually experience the death of the male household head. However, for the more vulnerable household, this precipitates a downward spiral which ends with loss of
the homestead, homelessness, destitution and the eventual breakup of the
household unit. There, the male migrant had been the main cash earner and
physical capital is lost as the household head weakens and dies. Through this
process, savings have been used and precious assets sold off to pay for medical expenses, costs of care-giving and a funeral. With less cash and less time
to farm, the family plants cassava rather than maize. This reduces the need for
labour but is a less nutritious source of food, which exacerbates malnutrition
and poor health. When the household is forced to sell off livestock, it is unable
to recover its herd and thus its assets are diminished. This eliminates another
source of protein as well. The household in Figure 2 is more vulnerable since
it is unable to diversify sources of farm and non-farm income. In addition,
dependency ratios increase with AIDS orphans joining the already struggling
household. In a meta-analysis of national nutrition and health surveys in SSA
over the past five years, households with more than one orphan were 3.2 times
more likely to have claimed food insecurity and hunger than households with
only one orphan or no orphans at all.173
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The widow may also be weakened if she contracts HIV or AIDS from her
husband. The household’s situation is further exacerbated by insecurity of tenure. The youth will attempt to farm, but without the training and knowledge
of farming techniques, traditional methods and biodiversity knowledge which
normally
passedAMon by their parents. Social capital is lost without
fig
2.pdf would
17/4/07 be10:25:16
serious intervention. All of this leads to food insecurity, malnutrition and poor
health. At some point, the widow or her daughters may be forced into risky survival strategies just to provide food for the household, further perpetuating the
HIV/AIDS cycle. If the household loses the homestead, they are propelled into
destitution and are forced to seek out work and shelter; this situation would
likely lead to the disintegration of the household. Gillespie maintains that land
acquisition by better-off households will likely increase as widows and orphans
fail to keep access and/or ownership rights to land after the husband/father
dies and may thus lose the chance to rent out the land as another source of
income. “The AIDS epidemic is thus intertwined with the way in which power,
authority, value and opportunity are distributed within societies.”174

Figure 2: Vulnerable Rural Household

Male migrant HH
becomes ill with HIV:
returns to rural home

Less cash
and labour

Wife becomes
care-giver

Young sons not
trained in
farming/biodiversity

Lower crop
production: less
nutritious food

Less time for farming/chores/
nurturing children

Loss of
cash/assests and
saving for medicine
and funeral

Less cash:
malnutrition
poor health

Wife does not have
security of tenure

Family loses
homestead

Stressors increase:
more dependents/
less food

Orphans
join HH

Food insecurity

Destitution: landless: must seek
work and home: family may break up

The less vulnerable household in Figure 3 is able to increase off-farm production and to access remittances from two urban migrants. This helps the
household to maintain crop production, proper nutrition and food security.
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Here also, a female relative migrates to help the household with chores and
children. Even though orphans join the household, the burden of care is shared
and there is enough food to avoid insecurity. In this situation, security of tenure
also ensures household and food security and thus risky survival strategies can
be avoided. The two urban migrants would also be able to benefit from food
remittances from the household.

Figure 3: More Diversified and Less Vulnerable Rural Household

Male migrant HH
becomes ill with HIV:
returns to rural home
Off farm income
increased
Two other migrants
remit cash
Loss of savings
for medicine and
funeral: assets
secure

Wife has security
of tenure

Wife becomes
care-giver

Less cash

HH income stable:
able to hire labour

Same crop
production: good
level of nutrition

Food security
maintained

Female relative joins
HH: helps with chores
and children

Orphans
join HH

HH Diversified enough to
survive and stay intact

No need for risky
survival strategies

As noted in previous sections, rural and urban households are inexorably
intertwined socially and economically. When HIV/AIDS affects households
in either or both locales, food and livelihood security is compromised. HIV
increases vulnerability to food insecurity, which increases vulnerability to
HIV infection and thus HIV can be seen as a shock to household security.175
Gillespie et al. describe HIV as a ‘unique, slow-moving and devastating
shock.’176 When households are stripped of livelihood assets, Mdladla et al.
term this a ‘creeping emergency’ which progressively diminishes the lives and
livelihoods of affected households.177
Research on the impact of HIV/AIDS on households in Malawi, Zambia and
Zimbabwe reveals that HIV-related morbidity and mortality increases vulner-
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ability to food insecurity and causes earlier engagement in distress strategies
in response to food insecurity, particularly on the part of poor households.178
Even though HIV/AIDS affected households might temporarily avoid destitution
through various response strategies, in the end they may not be able to avoid
a long-term downward spiral in food security and may never recover from the
shock.179 Compared with strategies adopted by other households facing other
shocks, the cumulative effect on households impacted by HIV/AIDS may be
permanent since these coping strategies are more likely to be irreversible.180
For example, following a shock to household income, households in Malawi
affected by HIV/AIDS took up to 18 months to stabilize, with a new equilibrium
income that was about half the pre-shock income levels.181 As HIV infection
rates increase, more households could be food secure on a permanent basis,
leading to increased malnutrition. This not only threatens the resilience of food
insecure households, but reduced ability to respond may hasten the onset of
famine conditions.182
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3.1

DIRECTIONS
AND
PRIORITIES

Conceptualizing the Links between
Migration, HIV/AIDS and Urban Food
Security
As established above, the social and economic relationship between rural and
urban areas is symbiotic, and food transfers to urban migrants can exceed
urban cash remittances, although remittances remain crucial to rural production. However, HIV/AIDS is undermining and weakening physical and social
capital in both rural and urban areas, particularly amongst poorer households.
Although migration is a key element of the new social economy, it is also a
significant vector of HIV/AIDS.
The linkages between migration, food security and HIV/AIDS constitute a
complex web of causal connections and feedback mechanisms. For example,
HIV/AIDS is a disease that demonstrably impacts rural food production. Not
only does this compromise the food security of rural producers, it could reduce
the flow of food from countryside to town (thus making the urban-based
migrant more vulnerable to food insecurity). At the same time, the rural household becomes more dependent on cash earnings and remittances for survival,
increasing the pressure for remittances. New forms of return “distress” migration to rural areas, simultaneously increasing the burden of provision on the
rural household. Again, if the migrant is expected or forced to remit a greater
proportion of his or her urban pay packet to compensate for declining agricultural production, their own ability to purchase food may be reduced. Given
that migrants spend a large proportion of their wages on necessities such as
food, their own diet could suffer. Migrants with HIV/AIDS themselves are, over
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time and in the absence of ART, likely to be less able to work to full capacity
and to remit. The problem here is that migrants are, by most accounts, more
vulnerable to HIV infection.
fig 4.pdf
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In the absence of definitive research, one way of conceptualizing the links
between migration, rural/urban food security and HIV/AIDS is through a more
systematic modeling of the potential connections and feedback loops. Figure
4, for example, suggests a set of connections between poverty, urbanization,
food insecurity, risky survival strategies and HIV/AIDS. This model is a useful programmatic statement of the potential linkages in the urban setting.
However, it does not systematically integrate the rural end of the migration
spectrum which, as this paper has argued, is also essential to understanding
urban food security.

Figure 4: Links Between Urban Food Insecurity and HIV/AIDS

Poverty and inequality
urbanisation

The poor: casual/temporary/
seasonal low wage

High food
prices

Faster progression
from HIV to AIDS;
new HIV infections

Small daily purchases
of low nutritional food

Other expenses:
shelter, transport,
health, education

Poor environment:
overcrowding, unhygienic,
lack of basic services

Poor health
malnutrition

Food insecurity

Risky survival strategies

For the poor urban migrant in a cash intensive environment, HIV/AIDS will
also potentially propel them into a downward spiral. As Figure 5 shows, with
physical capital loss, the migrant will lose capacity to work for cash, which
means they will increasingly be unable to meet basic needs, including food.
More than likely, food consumption will be the first item to be reduced as cash
and savings diminish. The ability of the migrant to engage in urban agriculture
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will be limited due to their loss of energy and poor health. With less cash for
survival, the migrant will be forced to stop remitting altogether or to reduce
amounts sent to the rural extended family, placing that family at risk with
respect to cash needed for agricultural input and basic needs. If food transfers
from the rural family have been reduced, or if food has inferior nutritional
quality, the migrant will have less access to nutritious food just when their
body needs decent nutrition. These conditions will exacerbate conditions of
malnutrition and poor health and will lead to food insecurity.

Figure 5: Linkages between HIV/AIDS, Migration and Food Security

Poverty and inequality
HIV/AIDS
Rural HH

Urban
migrant

Loss of labour

Physical capital loss

Loss of money/
assets/savings

Little to no cash
to rural areas

Less able
to work

Lower crop production;
less nutritious food

Little if any food
to send

Less access
to food

Less able to do
urban agriculture

Malnutrition
Poor health
Faster progression
from HIV to AIDS;
new HIV infections

Food insecurity

Risky survival strategies

The urban household would be forced to use up savings, sell valuable assets,
or borrow money at high interest rates. Dependency would increase on rural
and urban based extended family members, without the ability to reciprocate.
In the context of food insecurity and deprivation, household members would
be highly likely to engage in risky survival strategies, further exacerbating the
HIV/AIDS cycle. As the migrant is further debilitated from HIV/AIDS, they will
be forced to leave the city and return home to the rural areas for continuous

|43|

MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

care. This places a further burden on the rural household, not only with respect
to burden of care and the required use of assets, but also with loss of urban
remittances for agricultural production. If the rural household is vulnerable,
this could start a downward cycle resulting in increased participation in risky
survival strategies, perpetuation of the HIV/AIDS cycle, and ultimate destitution.
The new social economy which is underpinned by migration will be seriously compromised unless appropriate interventions – driven by praxis oriented
research and policy – can be undertaken within the framework of rural and
urban food production and access to food to break the vicious cycle of HIV/
AIDS, migration and food insecurity. The balance between cash remittances
from urban migrants and food transfers from rural households is a delicate one
for impoverished, vulnerable households. Thus, if urban migrants are able to
access food without compromising other basic needs, this would improve the
health of the migrant as well as reinforce the balance between cash remittances for rural production and survival and food transfers to the urban migrant.

3.2

Towards a Synthesis
This publication has highlighted the high urbanization rates and increasing
rural-urban linkages in the region, both domestic and cross-border, and demonstrated that rural and urban food security is highly interdependent. It has
been further argued that HIV/AIDS has a direct negative impact on urban food
security, most notably through the consequent reduction in physical capital
and production of food in rural areas and increased burden of dependence
of HIV-positive individuals on both urban and rural social units. This precipitates a deepening of poverty at the household level. Yet the three-way linkage between migration, HIV/AIDS and urban food security has yet to be fully
researched and understood.
Within this context, there is a need for research-informed interventions to
improve the conditions for poor households to create greater food security
opportunities and to mitigate the negative impacts of HIV/AIDS on the sustainability of livelihoods in urban centres in Southern and Eastern Africa. However,
as the knowledge gaps articulated below make clear, there are contextual
variations across the region, and it should be expected that this heterogeneous
geography will be reflected in the research outcomes. Developing typologies
will therefore be central to the ability of research to contribute meaningfully
to the growing need for greater support to poor households and to scale up
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interventions by understanding contextual needs and allowing intervention replication to take place. By so doing, not only is the potential impact of research
region-wide, but the outcomes may be useful as international public goods for
adaptation to other contexts in which the triple threat of migration, HIV/AIDS
and food insecurity is playing itself out (for example, in India).
Emerging from the review, it is possible to identify at least four key knowledge gaps in relation to the three interrelated elements of migration, HIV/AIDS
and urban food security within SEA, as follows:
a)

Typologies of Reciprocity: Different patterns and systems of urban-rural
linkages (migration) at the household level and the economic and nutritional impacts on household food security (quantifying the dimensions of
the new social economy of migration).

b)

Typologies of Risk: Different patterns and systems of urban-rural linkages
(migration) at the household level and the differentiated impacts of HIV
and AIDS on household food security (effects on resistance, susceptibility
and resilience of households to HIV and AIDS).

c)

Typologies of Coping: Impacts of HIV and AIDS on household food security strategies within the context of urban-rural linkages (changes, diversification strategies and the role of migration).

d)

Typologies of Intervention: Design of appropriate and supportive policy
and programming interventions to address the development challenges
posed by the triple threat of migration, HIV/AIDS and food insecurity.
The general research question can be stated as follows:

How does the mobility of people and urban-rural linkages affect the spread of
HIV and the impacts of AIDS on food and nutrition security?
Within the broad aim of addressing this question and documenting similarities and differences between contexts within the region, the following research
questions provide a starting point for understanding the interactions between
migration, HIV/AIDS and food and nutrition security:
a)

What is the contribution of rural food production at the household level
to the food budget of urban households?

b)

To what extent is HIV/AIDS impacting both rural and urban household
food security?

c)

How and to what degree are these impacts magnified or ameliorated by
rural-urban migration and rural-urban linkages at the household level?

d)

What role does urban agriculture play, together with other coping strate-
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gies, in meeting the food gap of urban households, and is this influenced
by HIV and AIDS?
e)

Based on the research findings, what policy and programming interventions are required to address the development challenges posed by the
triple threat of migration, HIV/AIDS and food insecurity?
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